



Kybernetika, Vol. 14 (1978), No. 4, (245)--260
Persistent URL: http://dml.cz/dmlcz/124444
Terms of use:
© Institute of Information Theory and Automation AS CR, 1978
Institute of Mathematics of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic provides access to digitized
documents strictly for personal use. Each copy of any part of this document must contain these
Terms of use.
This paper has been digitized, optimized for electronic delivery and stamped with
digital signature within the project DML-CZ: The Czech Digital Mathematics Library
http://project.dml.cz
K Y B E R N E T I K A — V O L U M E 14 (1978), N U M B E R 4 
General Coalition-Games 
M I L A N M A R E Š 
The main purpose of this paper is to suggest a general model of coalition-games including, as 
its special cases, the most important types of such games. It concerns the main types of coalition-
games investigated in the well-known literature, as well as the games which may, and probably 
shall, appear in the future as consequences of new applications of coalition-games theory. This 
paper presents such a general coalition-game model, shows its connections to some more special 
games, and also suggests a generalization of classical strong solutions of coalition-games, due for 
the presented game model. 
0. INTRODUCTION 
There exist a few models of coalition-games, investigated in many papers. Let us 
mention the most important of them: the games with side-payments and the games 
without them. These games are used, and slightly modified, for the purposes of some 
classical applications, and also in economical or psychological investigations, etc. 
But, the range of applications will probably increase. It means that the number of 
different modifications of the basic game models will increase, too. As some of the 
new non-standard applications will surely need only some of the properties assumed 
for the basic coalition-game model, the problem of essentiality of those properties 
and assumptions will appear. It concerns, especially, the assumption of superadditi-
vity of the coalition pay-offs. This assumption is very natural in case of the usual 
applications of coalition-games to the cooperative strategical behaviour, but it is 
problematic if the game model is used for modeling some other problems of groups 
or clusters forming. 
The main reason of the presented paper, as well as of the author's papers [5] and 
[9], is to suggest a game model including only the essential and necessary properties 
of the considered game. It will be advantageous if those assumptions reflect the most 
natural and generally valid properties of situations modelled by the coalition-games 
theory. This paper introduces also some basic properties of the suggested game model, 
and the concept of solution of such game is presented here. One of the goals of the 
following paragraphs is to show that the coalition-game model, suggested here, 
really covers a wide class of more special game concepts which were investigated in the 
well known literature, or which may appear in the future as a consequence of ap-
plications of the game theory into new areas. 
Last but not least, I should like to express here my thanks to RNDr Albert Perez, 
DrSc, from the Institute of Information Theory and Automation of Czechoslovak 
Academy of Sciences, whose interesting ideas about qualitatively new possibilities 
of the coalition-games applications into new fields, especially into the cluster analysis, 
turned my attention to the problems formulated in this paper and in paper [9]. 
1. GENERAL COALITION-GAME 
The concept of general coalition-game, introduced here, is investigated and 
discussed in the following sections of this paper and in papers [5] and [9]. 
In the whole paper we denote by R the set of all real numbers and by N the set 
of all positive integers. Symbol {xu ..., x„} denotes the set containing exactly the 
elements xu ..., x„, where n eN; symbol {x: x has the property P} denotes the set 
of exactly all elements x having the property P. 
Let us consider a non-empty and finite set /, and denote by J the class of all 
non-empty subsets of/, i.e. 
J = 2l - {0} . 
Let us consider a mapping Vfrom the class 2l into the family of subsets of Rl, 
V : 21 -> 2RI, 
such that for every Ke2l 
(IT) V(K) is closed; 
(1.2) ifx = (x ;) ie, e V(K), y = (yt)teI e R
l, and x{ ^ yjor all i e K, then y e V(K); 
(1.3) V(K) 4= 0 , V(K) = R'oK = 0. 
Then the pair 
r = (i, v) 
will be called a general coalition-game, the set / will be the set of players, and V will 
be the general characteristic function of the game T. 
The concept of general coalition-game, in some degree similar to the one defined 
above, was introduced already in [8] and also in some other works. However, it 
contained the superadditivity assumption of characteristic function, and it was, 
consequently, less general than the one considered here. There are also some other, 
more sophisticated, differences between the game model presented here and that 247 
one given in [8]. The superadditivity assumption, especially, can be easily formulated 
even for the general characteristic function V, and it would be natural in many 
applications of the suggested game model. But, it is not necessary, and also not 
desirable, in some other situations in which the general coalition-game may be 
applied. It is, why the superadditivity of the general characteristic function is not 
assumed here. 
It is useful to introduce some other notions describing the elements of the general 
coalition-game and the concepts derived from them. The sets belonging to the class 
J are called coalitions, and any partition of J into disjoint coalitions is called 
a coalition structure. Every vector x e R' is called an imputation. If there exists 
a coalition structure Jf such that 
xe n V(K) 
KeЯГ 
then x is an admissible imputation in the given game T. 
The assumption of the complete cooperation expressed by the fact that the class J 
contains all non-empty subsets of I (it means that all non-empty coalitions are 
considered to be possible and admissible) is seemingly strong and also innatural for 
some applications. In fact, this assumption is a formal one only. It enables us to 
simplify the formal notation and the formulation of some results. The results intro­
duced here or their very closed analogies keep valid even if some reasonable form 
of incomplete cooperation is considered, e.g. if we suppose that J is such a class 
of subsets of/ that for every K e J there exist L.,.. ., L„ e J, Lt n K = 0, Lt n Lj = 
= 0, for i=¥j, i,j—L,...,n, such that JK u L. u .. . u L„ = / , i.e. the set 
{K, Lx,..., L„} forms a coalition structure. 
On the other hand, the assumption of closedness of the general characteristic 
function Vis essential for the further steps of the presented work. But, it is acceptable 
from the point of view of the existing coalition-games models, and we may suppose 
it to be acceptable also for the expected future applications of the presented general 
coalition-game model. 
The same is true even in case of assumptions (1.2) and (1.3). They are essential 
for the results defived in this work, and they will be probably important even for 
other investigations of the suggested game model. However, they are natural, and it 
is not so easy to find an application of the coalition-games theory, for which that 
assumptions would not be acceptable. 
The general coalition-game introduced here has numerous special cases into which 
it may be modified. In the following four sections we briefly mention some of them 
which seem to be most important and most interesting ones. 
2. COALITION-GAMES WITH MIXED UTILITIES 
Let us consider the finite and non-empty set of players / , and the set of coalitions 
J'. Let us suppose that every coalition Ke J has a non-empty and finite set AK 
of pure strategies and the corresponding set SK of mixed strategies to its disposal. 
Every mixed strategy is a probability distribution on the set of pure strategies. It is 
usual to suppose that AKwL => AK x AL for K, Le J, K n L = 0. This assumption 
represents a superadditivity property for strategies. Its interpretation is obvious and 
well-known from the literature. 
Let us suppose, further, that there exist elementary utility functions e{, i e I, which 
prescribe to every coalition structure Jf and to every vector of pure strategies 
a = (a.cWe X AK = A* 
a real-valued vector 
M-r,o))«. 
These elementary utility functions can be extended in very natural way to the mixed 
utility functions uh i e I, defined on the class of pairs consisting of coalition structures 
and of corresponding vectors of mixed strategies. Then the mixed utility functions 
uh iel, prescribe to every coalition structure Jf and to every vector of mixed 
strategies 
S = {SK)KEX e X SK 
KeJf 
the utilities 
(2.1) «.(jr,.) = £e,(.r,c.)rK(«x). 
where the sum is taken over a = {aK)KeX e Ax. 
Then the coalition-game with mixed utilities is defined as the triple 
r . ={i,{AK}Kes,{Ui}ieI). 
We may suppose that the utilities are not transitive, it means that there is no pos-
sibility of side-payments in the given game F1. (The opposite case of games with 
transitive utility is discussed in Sections 4 and 5). We may suppose, too, that the 
players in Tx are allowed not to exploit all the obtained utility. It means that if 
a coalition structure Jf" and a vector of mixed strategies s prescribe to a player i e I 
some utility M,(JT, S) then they prescribe to him also all utility values u* S ut{jf, s). 
For the coalition-game with mixed utilities the following statement can be easily 
proved. 
Theorem 1. The game with mixed utilities rt is a special case of the general 
coalition-game f = (/, V), where for every K e J is 
(2.2) V(K) = {x = (x,)Isf: there exists a coalition structure Jf and a vector of 
mixed strategies $ = (sK)KeX such that for all i e I is xx ^ uf^t, $)}. 
Moreover, the sets V(K) are convex closed sets for all coalitions KeJ. 
Proof. We have to prove the properties of the general characteristic function V, 
introduced on Section 1. Property (IT) follows from the inequalities in (2.2), as 
well as property (1.2). This property is interpreted for the described type of games 
by the consideration introduced above the theorem. Also property (1.3) follows 
immediately from the relation (2.2). The convexity of the sets V(K), KeJ, follows 
from (2.1), as the set of possible values of the utility function ulpf, $) is, for a given 
coalition structure j f and player i e I, a convex combination of the values of elemen-
tary utility functions e,(</f", a), where a e Ax. 
3. MARKET GAMES 
The previous section of this paper was devoted to the games, in which no pos-
sibility of the utility transition was admitted. The only possibility of certain utility 
distribution among members of the same coalition is the choice of a proper mixed 
strategy. Then the utility is distributed among the members of coalition in statistical 
sense. They may hope to obtain, after a sufficiently large number of repetitions of the 
same game, coalition structure and strategies, the total profit proportional to the 
bargained rate of utilities. 
In this section, we shall mention another type of coalition-games, in which a specific 
possibility of utility transmission exists. There does not still exist any common and 
lineary useful representant of utility, but the utility may be transfered by means 
of some individually useful representants of it. It means that the transfered utility 
may change (decrease or increase) its value during the transmission process. We call 
such games the market games, and we interpret and describe them in the following 
way. 
We suppose that there exists a set of players / , which is finite and non-empty, with 
the class of coalitions J. We suppose, further, that after the realization of the strateg-
ical part of the game, or after another arbitrary process, every coalition KB J 
obtains its guaranted prize, which is represented by some quantity of goods aK. 
These goods are distributed among members of the coalition K into amounts oe;, 
i e K, such that 
(3.1) «K = E«(. 
There exist utility functions uhiel, defined on the set of all possible quantities 
of goods, which represent the utility of any possible amount of goods for individual 
players. They prescribe a real number uia^) to every quantity of goods and each 
player. 
250 It is useful to note that there usually exist more kinds of goods in the given market 
game. If we denote their number by m e N, then the amounts of goods aK and a, 
are real-valued vectors 
% = (« i ) ; - i . - , «i = («;);= i.....» > 
with components representing the amounts of all considered kinds of goods. Then 
the utility functions map Rm into R, ut : R
m -» R, i el, and the condition (3.1) can 
be substituted by the system of equalities 
(3.2) aK = £er/ for all j = 1, . . . , m . 
ieK 
It is obvious that the real possibilities of distribution of goods, it means also of 
distribution of utility, are very various. 
We shall denote by A(K),Ke J, the sets of all possible distributions of the quantity 
of goods aK among players in K, e.g. 
(3.3) A(K) = {(at)ieK : a, = (aj),= 1 m e R
m, £ a\ = a{, j = 1, ..., m} , 
ieK 
m e N, m 2; 1 . 
As the amounts of goods <xt are m-dimensional real-valued vectors (aj)J = 1; >me R
m, 
the classes A(K), Ke J, are subsets of the space (Rm)K. It follows from (3.1) and 
(3.2) immediately that the sets A(K) defined by (3.3) are closed and convex subsets 
of (Rm)K, as they are Cartesian products of hyperplanes of RK spaces. 
After introducing all necessary concepts, we may define the market game. It is 
the quadruple 
r2 = (/, K W {A(K)}Ke„ {Ut}u). 
It is evident that the condition (3.1) and its specification (3.2) are not the only 
conditions which may be used for the definition of the sets of possible distributions 
of goods A(K). Condition (3.2) is usually completed by some additional conditions, 
usually limiting the minimal values of a{, e.g. a{ 5; 0, ieK, K e J, j = 1 , . . . . m, 
etc It is not difficult to verify that the validity of following two theorems is preserved 
even for other forms of the sets A(K), Ke J, which are closed, respectively convex, 
subsets of (Rm)K. 
Theorem 2. Let all sets A(K), Kel,be closed subsets of (Rm)K, and let the utility 
functions uh i el, be continuous on R
m. Then the market game F2 is a special case 
of the general coalition-game F = (I, V), where for every coalition K e J* is 
(3.4) V(K) = {x = (xi)ie]: there exists (a,)iei 
such that for all i eK is xt ^ «;(<*,•)} . 
Proof. If A(K) are closed sets and w; are continuous functions, then the ine-
qualities in (3.4) imply also the closedness of the sets V(K). Moreover, the same 
inequalities in (3.4) and the finiteness of the vectors aK imply the validity of (1.2) and 
(1.3) for the sets V(K). 
Theorem 3. If all sets A(K), Ke J, are closed and convex in (Rm)K, and if all 
utility functions uh i e I, are continuous and concave on R
m, i.e. 
u;(;.a; + (1 - A)/.,) S Au((cc() + (1 - A) utf,) 
for 
0 ^ X ^ 1 , at, ^ E R
m , 
then the sets V(K) defined by (3.4) are convex subsets of R1. 
Proof. Let us choose x = (x ;) ie / e V(K), y = (y ;) i s / e V(K) and (a;)ieK e A(K), 
(P,)ieKeA(K) such that for all ieK is w;(a;) ^ x ; and u,(/?,-) ^ j - , , If 0 <. X <: 1, 
then for all i e K is 
Ax; + (1 - A) y ; ^ Aw,(a,) + (l - A) u;Q3;) ^ i/;(Aa; + (l - X) /,,) . 
Moreover, the convexity of A(K) implies that 
(Aa; + (l -X)fl)ieKeA(K), 
and consequently, 
(Ax; + (1 -X)yt)leIeV(K), 
where the property (1.2) was used for i $ K. 
Conditions of closedness and convexity of A(K), Ke J, as well as the condition 
of continuity of w;, iel, are natural and usually accepted in economical models. 
It means that they are no exceptional constrains of the practical applicability of the 
results proved above to economical situations. Even the concavity of utility functions 
is usually assumed in economical models and may be, without any serious loss of 
generality, assumed in the market game model, if it is necessary. 
4. COALITION-GAMES WITH SIDE-PAYMENTS 
In this section we suppose that the utility obtained by players is completely trans-
ferable among them. It means that there exists a linear representant of utility, common 
for all players. Such games are well known in the literature. We suppose that there 
exists a set of players / with the class of coalitions J, and that there exists a mapping 
v from the class J into R, usually called the characteristic function of the coalition-
252 game with side-payments. It is usually supposed that the characteristic function v 
is superadditive, i.e. 
v(K u L) ^ v(K) + v(L), for K, Le J, K n L = 0 . 
Then the coalition-game with side-payments is the pair 
r3 = (/,,). 
The values v(K), Ke J>, of the characteristic function v, represent the total utility 
guaranted for the whole coalition K. The players in K are allowed to distribute this 
common utility v(K) in arbitrary way. During this distribution, the total sum of 
utilities in the coalition K does not change, and it is equal to v(K), Tf we denote 
by (ui)ieK, Uj e R, the vector of the final utilities obtained by players in K, then 
(4.1) £ u, = v(K), 
ieK 
and all real-valued vectors fulfilling (4.1) represent the admissible distributions of 
utility in K. Even in this case, we may accept the assumption that players are not 
forced to use all the obtained utility. It means that also all real-valued vectors (u'i)ieK 
such that 
(4.2) X < = <K) 
ieK 
are admissible distributions of utility among players in the coalition K. 
It can be easily seen that the coalition-game introduced in this way is a special 
case of the general coalition-game. In fact, the need to generalize the concept of 
coalition-game with side-payments motivated the creation of the general coalition-
game. The relation between general coalition-game and the game with side-payments 
is more precisely formulated in the following statement. 
Theorem 4. The coalition-game with side-payments L3 is a special case of the 
general coalition-game T = (/, V), where for every K e </ is 
(4.3) V(K) = {X = (x[)i5l:YJxi^v(K)}. 
ieK 
The sets V(K) are half-spaces of R1. The superadditivity of the mapping v implies 
that for all K, L e J, K n L = 0, is 
(4.4) V(K u L) -a V(K) n V(L). 
Proof. The first statement of this theorem is obvious. The sets V(K) are closed 
half-spaces of R1, as follows from (4.3). The same formula implies the conditions 
(1.2) and (1.3), immediately. If the mapping v is superadditive, i.e. 
v(K u L) ^ v(K) + v(L) , K,LeJ, K n L = 0 , 
then, for an arbitrary x e V(K) n V(L), is 
X x ; g »(K) and £ xf g i>(L), 
ieK is/. 
as follows from (4.3). As X n L = 0, the above inequalities imply that 
X x ; ^ v(K) + v(L) ^ v(K u L) , 
iEftut 
and, hence x e V(fC u L). 
5. COALITION-GAMES WITH RESTRICTED SIDE-PAYMENTS 
The coalition-games mentioned in this section represent a special modification 
of the coalition-games with side-payments introduced in the previous one. We 
assume that the coalition-game with side-payments T3 = (I, v) with the set of players 
/ and characteristic function v is given. We do not suppose, here, that for any coalition 
K e J all distributions (u)ieK, fulfilling (4.1), of the total utility v(K) are admissible. 
We suppose that for any coalition K e J- a set T(K) c RK is given, such that all 
vectors (u)ieKe T(K) fulfil (4.1), and T(K) contains exactly all admissible distribu-
tions of the total utility v(K) of the coalition K. As usually, even in this case we 
suppose that players need not accept or utilize all the utility which they obtain. 
It means that if (u)ieK belongs to T(K) and (u')ieKe R
1 is such that u\ ^ u, for all 
i e K, then (u';)leK represents also an admissible distribution of utility among members 
of the coalition K. Then the coalition-game with restricted side-payments is the triple 
T4 = (l,v,{T(K)}Kes). 
The extremal example of such games is the coalition-game with restricted side-
payments, where the distribution of utility among members of coalitions is strictly 
given. In such game the sets T(K) are one-element sets for all coalitions Ke J. 
It is more than obvious that the coalition-game with restricted side-payments T4 
is a special modification of the general coalition-game T = (/, V) with 
(5.1) V(K) = {x = (x.) teJ: there exists y = (y,)ieK e T(K) 
such that X, ^ ytfor all i e K} , KeJ, 
if and only if the sets T(K) are closed. Then the closedness of V(K), as well as the 
properties (1.2) and (1.3), follow from (5.1) immediately. Moreover, if the sets T(K) 
are convex, then also V(K) are convex. 
The restrictions, stronger or weaker, put on the sets of admissible distributions 
of utility among members of coalitions in coalition-games with side-payments, 
represent a frequent element of the practical applications of those games. Then the 
superadditivity of the characteristic function t often looses much of its sense, and 
the consequence of superadditivity of the characteristic function v for the general 
characteristic function V, proved in the second part of Theorem 4, is not generally 
true. 
6. STRONGLY STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES 
In this section, we define and investigate the concept of the bargaining solution 
in the class of the coalition structures of a general coalition-game. More special 
cases of that game were mentioned in the previous sections, and much more about 
some of them we can find in literature. There are also more kinds of solutions defined 
in the literature for the particular special types of coalition-games. We can divide 
them, at least roughly, into two groups. The former one of them contains the "ideal" 
solutions fulfilling the demands of all players and coalitions, like the core of the 
coalition-game with side-payments. The necessity to fulfil the exactly given complex 
of demands causes certain uniformity of these solutions. They differ in their formal 
description, as they are adapted for differently defined games. However, the essential 
properties, expressed by that formal description, are remarcably similar. 
The latter group of solutions is much more varied. It contains the solutions which 
have not all ideal properties, but which are acceptable for the most powerful players 
and coalitions, and which exist even in such games, in which the ideal solution is 
impossible. This group is considerably wide, it contains such solutions like von Neu-
mann - Morgenstern solution or Aumann - Maschler bergaining set for the coalition-
games with side-payments, and a lot of other solutions advantageous for different 
purposes and applications. In this section and in the following one, we suggest an 
"ideal" solution of the general coalition-game. It means, a generalization of solutions 
included into the first group is presented here. Such solutions are called, here, strong 
or strongly stable solutions. Certain attempt to suggest also a solution of the second, 
"non-ideal, type is presented in author's paper [9], even if such solution can not be 
a generalization of all so various solutions of that kind. 
The solutions defined for particular coalition-games in the literature are usually 
intent on the definition of the resulting pay-offs or utilities obtained by players. 
It is true, namely, for the "ideal" solutions. However, not only the final pay-offs 
are important. In some cases, we are interested in the coalitions or coalition structures 
which enable the desired pay-offs. This opinion was mentioned in author's paper [3], 
and, likewise, some problems connected with the applications of the coalition-games 
theory to some new areas show that the finding of the resultant coalition structures 
is an important element of the coalition-game solution. In case of the strongly stable 
solutions of the classical types of coalition-games, like the coalition-game with side-
payments or the coalition-game with strategies and mixed utilities, the form of the 
resulting coalition structures is not so important. It is caused by the superadditivity 
assumption which means that the strongly stable pay-offs, if they exist, are always 
achievable for the all-players coalition I. As no form of superadditivity is assumed 
for the general coalition-game, we are intersted here in both, the resulting coalition 
structures and the resulting imputations realized by these coalition structures. 
In this section, we suggest the definition of strongly stable coalition structures 
and derive some of their properties. First of all, we introduce the following auxiliary 
symbol. 
If Ji cz J is a. set of coalitions then we denote by V(Ji) the set 
(6.1) V(Ji) = D V(K) . 
KeM 
In this way, we have practically extended the range of the general characteristic 
function V from the class of all coalitions (or from the class of all one-element 
subclasses of J) to the family of all non-empty subclasses of J. As we suppose that 
V(0) = R', according to (1.3), then V is defined for all subclasses of J. This form 
of the definition of the general characteristic function V was used in [5]. The defi-
nition of the general characteristic function V used in this paper is more useful 
for the purposes of this work, and it is also better for the illustration of mutual 
connections between general coalition-game and its special cases. Even if both 
definitions of V, given in [5] and in this paper, are formally different, the results 
obtained in [5] are still valid for the general characteristic function V defined 
by conditions (l . l) , (1.2) and (1.3) in Section 1; especially if the auxiliary concept 
(6.1) is used. It means that we may refer and use the results derived in [5] for the 
purposes of this work. 
Definition 1. If K e J is a coalition and V(K) is the value of general characteristic 
function then the set 
V*(K) = {x = (Xi)teI e R'-.for all y = ( y f ) « e V(K) 
either x ; > Vifor some i e K, or yt = x ; 
for all ieK] 
is called the superoptimum of the coalition K. 
For the superoptimum function V*, the following statements are true. 
Remark 1. It follows from Definition 1 immediately that for every coalition 
KeJ and every x e V*(K), y e R1, such that x( ^ yt for all ieK, is also y e V*(K). 
Remark 2. It follows from Definition 1 and from (l . l) that for every coalition 
KeJ is V(K) n V*(K) 4= 0. 
Remark 3. It follows from Definition 1 that for every coalition KB J is V(K) u 
u V*(K) = R1. This statement was also proved in [5] as Lemma 1. 
Lemma 1. If K e J is a coalition and x is an imputation such that x e V(K) -
- V*(K)then there exists an imputation y e V(K) n V*(K) such that xf g y{ for 
all iel. 
Proof. If x<£ V*(K) then there exists y e V(K) such that xf ^ y, for all i e K 
and, according to (1.2), the imputation y may be chosen so that also yt 2: xf 
for all iel — K. The closedness assumption (1.1) implies that the imputation y 
may be chosen in such a way that y is a boundary point of the set V(K). Hence, there 
is no imputation z e V(K) such that z, 2: j ; , for all i e K. It means that y may be 
chosen so that y e V(K) n V*(K). 
Lemma 2. If K, Le J are coalitions such that K <= Land 
V(K)= [ V ( L ) n R K ] x R'"* 
then also 
V*(K) = [V*(L)nR*] x R1"". 
Proof. 
F*(K) = {x = (xf)„, e J? ' :Vy = (>,)„. e V(K) 
ej'ifter 3 (/ e K, yf < xf), or V (i e K, yf = x,)} = 
= {x = (x,.)fEj e K ' : V y = (>.)h l 6 [V(L) n R«] x R'~* 
ei'fher 3 (i e K, yt < x,) or V (i e K, yt = x,-)} = 
= [ V * ( L ) n R * ] x R'"K. 
Definition 2. If JT is a coalition structure then we say that Jf is strongly stable 
iff there exists an imputation x e V(jf) such that x belongs to the superoptimum 
of all coalitions in J. 
Some fundamental properties of strongly stable coalition structures were derived 
in [5] already. Here, we repeat the most important of them and introduce a few 
more. The following lemma was proved in [5] as Lemma 2. 
Lemma 3. If X is a coalition structure and if there exists Le J such that V(jf) c: 
c V(L) - V*(L) then X is not strongly stable. 
Corollary. If a coalition structure Jf is strongly stable then V(jf) n V(L) n 
n V*(L) =f= 0 for all L e . / , as follows from Lemma 3 and from (1.2). 
Definition 3. We say that a coalition L e J> is effective iff there exists an imputation 
x e V(L) such that x e V*(j) for all J e J, J <= L. If i f is a coalition structure then 
we say that i<? is effective from below iff all coalitions in if are effective. 
Remark 4. As every coalition K e J is a subset of itself, it follows from Defini-
tion 3 immediately that K is effective iff there exists x e V(K) n V*(K) such that 
x e V*(J) for all J <= K, J e J. 
Lemma 4. An arbitrary coalition structure if is effective from below iff there 
exist x e V(<£) such that x e V*(j) for all J e J such that J c L for some L e if. 
The previous lemma was proved in [5] as Lemma 3. Its statement follows im-
mediately from Definition 3. 
Remark 5. The coalition structure {/} containing exactly one coalition of all 
players is effective from below iff the coalition I is effective, as follows from Defini-
tion 3 immediately. 
Remark 6. All one-player coalitions are effective, as follows from Remark 2. 
It means that each player i el belongs to some effective coalition and that the coali-
tion structure containing exactly all one-player coalitions is always effective from 
below. 
Lemma 5. If L e J is not effective then there exists a set of coalitions 
J*(L) = {J: JeJ, J c L, J is effective} 
such that 
V*(L)=> П V*(J). 
JEJЦL) 
The previous lemma was introduced in [5] as Lemma 4. 
Lemma 6. If a coalition LeJ is effective then there always exists a coalition 
structure if, effective from below, such that Le ££. 
Proof. The statement of this lemma follows from Remark 6 immediately. If L 
is an effective coalition then we can construct a coalition structure ££ containing L 
and exactly all one-player coalitions {/} such that i e I — L. Then if is effective 
from below. 
The following two theorems were proved in [5] as Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. 
They follow from the previous lemmas. 
Theorem 5. I f x e R ' is an imputation belonging to the superoptimum of all 
effective coalitions then it belongs to the superoptimum of all coalitions. 
Theorem 6. A coalition structure JC is strongly stable if and only if there exists 
an imputation x e V(jf) such that x belongs to the superoptimum V*(J) of all 
effective coalitions JeJ. 
7. STRONG STABILITY OF IMPUTATIONS 
After having introduced the concept of the strongly stable coalition structures, 
we may define and investigate the strong stability of imputations. As it was said in 
the introduction of the previous section, the solutions presented, for special types 
of coalition-games, in the literature concern usually the imputations only. It means 
that more connections between the strongly stable imputations defined below and 
some special strong solutions from the literature can be found. For the core of the 
coalition-game with side-payments, the connection is derived at the end of this 
section. 
Definition 4. We say that an imputation x e R1 is strongly stable iff it is admissible 
and it belongs to the superoptimum of all coalitions. 
Remark 7. The imputation xeR1 is strongly stable iff there exists a coalition 
structure :/f such that 
x e V(jf) n ( f| V*(L)) , 
L E J » 
as follows from the previous definition immediately. 
The following two theorems were proved in [5] as Theorem 3 and Theorem 4. 
They describe interesting properties of strongly stable imputations, and follow from 
lemmas and theorems given in the previous section, as well as from Definition 4. 
Theorem 7. There exists a strongly stable imputation in a given general coalition-
game r if and only if there is at least one strongly stable coalition structure in F. 
Theorem 8. An imputation x e V(jf), where Jf is a coalition structure, is strongly 
stable if and only if x e V*(j) for all effective coalitions J e J. 
The strong mutual connection existing between strongly stable imputations and 
the core of the coalition-game with side payments is formulated and proved by the 
next theorem. If T3 = (/, v) is a coalition-game with side-payments and with super-
additive characteristic function v, which was discussed in Section 4, then the core 
of r 3 is the set of imputations 
(7.1) C = {x = (x,),el e R
1: £ x, £ v(l), and for all 
isl 
KeJ isY, X, = v(K)} ; 
isK 
then the following statement holds. 
Theorem 9. Let us suppose that the considered general coalition-game T is a coali-
tion game with side-payments and with the superadditive characteristic function v, 
i.e. that for all coalitions Ke J there exists a real number v(K) such that 
(7.2) V(K) = {x = (*.)„,. _ x ^ v(K)} . 
ieK 
Then an imputation x e R1 is strongly stable if and only if x e V(l) and for all coali-
tions K e J is 
Z Xi ^ v(K) . 
ieK 
Proof. The superadditivity of the characteristic function v and relation (7.2) 
imply that any imputation x is admissible iff the inequality 
2>«S«(J) 
is I 
holds. Moreover, if (7.2) is fulfilled for all K e J then there exists, for every y e Rl 
such that 
Z y, < V(K) , 
ieK 
an imputation x e V(K) such that xt > yt for all i eK. It means that for any KeJ 
it is 
V*(K) = {yeR':Y.yi^<K)}, 
ieK 
and the statement is proved. 
Corollary. The previous theorem implies immediately that the core of a coalition-
game with side-payments is identical with the class of exactly all strongly stable 
imputations in the sense of Definition 4. 
(Received March 10, 1978.) 
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